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Abstract
The Spanish growth experience over the 1995-2007 period was characterized by the 
remarkable surge in employment and investment as well as the dismal evolution of productivity. 
These macroeconomic fl uctuations were coupled with an unprecedented credit boom fueled 
by a housing bubble. This article reviews a line of research that investigates the connection 
between these developments using micro-level data on Spanish fi rms and banks. The evidence 
suggests that the abundant availability of credit, partially induced by the real estate bubble, 
and its propagation through the Spanish production network explain a sizable part of the 
massive accumulation of labor and capital. Also, the deterioration in the allocation of resources 
across fi rms is the main responsible of the fall in aggregate productivity. The allocation of 
credit across fi rms and municipalities, the softening of banks lending standards, and the low 
productivity of Spanish fi rms can partly explain this deterioration.
Keywords: Spain, fi rm level data, TFP, misallocation, input-output linkages.
JEL classifi cation: D24, O11, O47, E44, G21, L25.
Resumen
El patrón de crecimiento de la economía española durante el período 1995-2007 se caracterizó 
por el notable aumento del empleo y de la inversión, así como por la ausencia de ganancias 
en productividad. Estos desarrollos macroeconómicos se combinaron con un aumento del 
crédito bancario, que, a su vez, se vio favorecido por incrementos sin precedentes en los 
precios del mercado inmobiliario. Este artículo resume una línea de investigación que explora 
la conexión entre estos desarrollos de acuerdo con datos microeconómicos sobre empresas 
y bancos españoles. La evidencia disponible sugiere que la abundante disponibilidad de 
crédito, parcialmente inducida por la burbuja inmobiliaria, y su propagación a través de la 
estructura productiva española explican una parte considerable de la acumulación masiva de 
empleo y capital. Además, el deterioro en la asignación de recursos entre empresas dentro 
de cada sector se revela como el principal responsable de la caída en la productividad 
agregada. La asignación del crédito entre las empresas, la relajación de los estándares 
crediticios de los bancos y la baja productividad de las empresas españolas pueden explicar, 
al menos parcialmente, este fenómeno.
Palabras clave: España, datos de empresa, PTF, asignación de recursos, relaciones 
input-output.
Códigos JEL: D24, O11, O47, E44, G21, L25.
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1 Introduction
The Spanish economy witnessed the longest expansion in recent history during the period 1995-2007.
Real GDP grew above 3.5% per year over these 13 years. This figure is well above 2.4%, the average
annual growth across other European countries. The ratio of Spanish income per capita to that of
EU-12 was 77% in 1995 and reached 93% in 2007. Despite this performance is truly remarkable, it
proved to be unsustainable with the burst of the global financial crisis. A deeper understanding of
the drivers shaping the 1995-2007 boom might be helpful to learn from the past and ensure that the
Spanish economy prolongs the current pace of sustained economic growth.
A standard growth accounting exercise for the 1995-2007 period shows that the Spanish boom
was driven by factor accumulation (labor and capital) rather than by productivity gains. Since
both labor and especially capital grew more than final production, total factor productivity (TFP)
was reduced by 0.7% per year. This expansion was also accompanied by a housing bubble that
fueled an unprecedented increase in credit, which expanded considerably faster than GDP. These two
developments are in sharp contrast to other EU countries as shown in Section 2, which motivates the
quest for the ultimate determinants of the Spanish boom experience. This article summarizes some
pieces of evidence on how these aggregate fluctuations could have been originated through the lens
of the micro data on Spanish firms and banks.
Section 3 quantifies the consequences of the unprecedented credit boom on the real economy.
In line with previous results in the literature, Alfaro et al. (2018) find that the effects of banks
credit supply shocks on firms employment and investment are sizable in the case of the Spanish
economy.1 Crucially, we also uncover the importance of the transmission of these shocks over the
production network through buyer-supplier relationships. Indeed, the aggregate impact of credit
shocks is doubled once this propagation is taken into account. The aggregate quantification in Alfaro
et al. (2018) suggests that around 20% of overall employment growth in Spain over the expansion
period can be explained by credit supply shocks.
Turning to the origins of this overall increase in credit supply, Martin et al. (2018) argue that
the Spanish housing bubble initially displaced credit from non-construction to construction sectors,
but eventually increased net worth of banks giving rise to a crowding-in effect from construction to
non-construction sectors, which may partly explain the generalized boom in credit that fueled the
surge in factor accumulation in all sectors.
Section 4 of this article discuss the role of resource misallocation across firms as the key driver
1Identification of credit supply from the data relies on within-firm variation in a given year: imagine we observe
credit growth of a given firm in a given year with two different banks; if credit growth is larger with one bank than
with the other, it is assumed that it must be due to supply factors at the bank level since demand forces at the firm
level are kept constant.
of the dismal evolution of aggregate productivity. In Garc´ıa-Santana et al. (2016) we show that
during the Spanish boom, too much resources, especially capital flows, were assigned to the worst
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firms with the subsequent costs in terms of aggregate productivity.2 Crucially, this phenomenon was
present in all industries and not only on those related to the construction sector, which casts doubt
on the conventional wisdom that the sectoral composition of the Spanish economy is responsible of
the dismal evolution of productivity.
Despite more research is needed, Section 4 also outlines some of the factors that might be at the
root of this misallocation of capital. First, in Basco et al. (2018) we show that too much credit was
fueled to unproductive firms with high real-estate collateral in municipalities with higher housing
prices growth.3 Second, Jime´nez el at. (2018) illustrate that banks softened their credit standards
in terms of firms’ productivity during the boom. Third, it is worth highlighting the scarcity of
attractive/productive projects available in the Spanish economy to be financed: Moral-Benito (2018)
documents the poor performance of Spanish firms in terms of productivity vis-a-vis their European
peers, even controlling for size, which is typically to blame.
Needless to say, there are other factors that played a role during the Spanish boom. For instance,
Spain received massive migration inflows that contributed to an average annual population growth of
1.4% between 2000 and 2007 and increased the weight of the foreign population from 2 to 12% (see
Izquierdo et al. (2016)). However, a detailed review of all of them is beyond the scope of the present
article. Moreover, the reader must also take into account the so-called streetlight effect, which is a
type of observational bias that occurs when people are searching for something and look only where
it is easiest. In this case, the availability of firm- and bank-level data allows analyzing in detail the
pattern of resources and credit allocation across firms, which seems to be crucial for understanding
the macroeconomic evolution over the 1995-2007 period.
Finally, the ultimate cause that triggered all these events is not well understood yet. As argued by
Santos (2014), many countries witnessed real estate bubbles over this period (US, Ireland, Greece),
which points to the existence of worldwide common factors. Among them, loose monetary policies
and the savings glut of export led economies are typically highlighted. Massive capital flows towards
particular countries together with the decline in interest rates may lead to poor capital allocation
decisions given that the signal-extraction problem faced by banks to identify good firms becomes
more noisy (see Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2013)).
2If the marginal Euro in the economy is used by a firm with lower marginal productivity of capital rather than
by a higher productivity firm, aggregate productivity is dampened. According to our findings, this is precisely what
characterized the functioning of the Spanish economy during the boom.
3A complementary explanation is that of Gopinath et al. (2017), who find evidence that the unprecedented fall
in interest rates caused that capital was misallocated towards firms with more net worth but not necessarily higher
productivity.
2 Aggregate facts
This section briefly summarizes the macroeconomic fluctuations that characterized the Spanish boom
period in comparison to the remaining EU4 countries, namely, France, Germany, and Italy. The
Spanish economy grew at the average rate of 3.5% per year between 1995 and 2007. This expansion,
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the longest in the twentieth century according to Berge and Jorda (2013), helped Spanish income per
capita surpass the EU average in the early 2000s. However, a standard growth accounting exercise
shows that the boom was driven by factor accumulation (labor and capital) rather than by increases
in productivity. Figure 1 clearly illustrates this pattern. The employment contribution to output
(total hours worked) expanded 3.8 percent a year in 1995-2007. This was the result of three main
factors: a fast growing working age population, mainly due to migration flows, an increasing labor
force participation rate, mainly reflecting the incorporation of women into the labor market, and a
decline of the unemployment rate from the high values achieved in 1993. The capital stock also grew
at an unprecedented pace of 5.2 percent a year. The rise of the construction sector together with
easy borrowing conditions played an important role in the expansion of the capital stock in Spain.
Since both labor and capital grew more than final production, total factor productivity (TFP) was
reduced by 0.7% per year.
Figure 1: The Spanish growth experience.
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Notes. This plot shows the evolution of GDP, capital, labor, and TFP in Spain during the period 1995-2007. Source:
Garc´ıa-Santana et al. (2016).
As illustrated in Figure 2, these Spanish figures are in sharp contrast to those of France, Germany
and Italy. In the average EU4 country, GDP growth was 1.8% per year with growth rates of 0.9%
and 2.4% for labor and capital, respectively. As a result, TFP growth in the EU4 was on average
0.6% per year, which is in contrast to the Spanish annual rate of -0.7%. Similar differences arise if we
compare the Spanish case with other developed economies such as the United States or the United
Kingdom. To sum up, the Spanish growth experience over the 1995-2007 period seems rather unique
in terms of standard growth accounting exercises.
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Figure 2: Growth accounting across EU4 countries.
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Notes. This plot shows the evolution of GDP, capital, labor, and TFP in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain during
the period 1995-2007. Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database.
Last but not least, we can place the housing bubble together with the credit boom at the root of
the Spanish macroeconomic evolution over the 1995-2007 period. After the 1993 crisis, housing con-
struction and housing prices started to increase massively. According to Jimeno and Santos (2014),
the Spanish economy presented some characteristics that made it especially prone for a housing
bubble, namely, a banking sector capable of channeling capital inflows to mortgages, a construction
sector which had build up large capacities through infrastructure projects in the 1980s and 1990s,
and favourable demographic trends. Once prices started to rise, they were further sustained by
changes in zoning and land use regulations in 1997 and 1998 (whose main effect was to decentralize
and liberalize the decisions about housing permits), and lax lending standards, especially in regional
banks subject to capture by the local political elites (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2013), Jimeno and
Santos (2014), Akin et al. (2014)). As a result, nominal house prices tripled between 1995 and 2007,
as shown in the left panel of Figure 3.
The housing bubble was accompanied by a strong credit boom: the right panel of Figure 3
shows that credit to households and firms expanded considerably faster than GDP, leading to an
unprecedented increase of the aggregate leverage ratio between 1995 to 2007. As in the case of the
growth accounting exercises in Figure 2, the Spanish boom in housing prices and credit is remarkable
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when looking at the remaining EU4 countries. Housing prices grew at the average rate of 9.2% per
year between 1995 and 2007 in Spain, while this figure is 3.8% for the average EU4 country. Turning to
credit, average annual growth of the credit-to-GDP ratio in Spain was 7.2%, while the corresponding
average figure for the other EU4 countries is 1.3%.
Figure 3: The Spanish housing and credit boom.
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Notes. This plot shows the evolution of housing prices and credit-to-GDP ratios in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain
during the period 1995-2007. Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and World Development Indicators.
All in all, two facts stand out from the previous narrative of the Spanish growth experience
over the 1995-2007 period: (i) the dismal evolution of aggregate productivity due to the massive
accumulation of capital and labor; (ii) a housing bubble that fueled an unprecedented credit boom.
The remainder of this article discuss how these developments are related through the lens of the
micro data on Spanish firms and banks.
3 On the causes and consequences of the credit boom
As shown in Section 2, the macroeconomic evolution of the Spanish economy over the 1995-2007
period was coupled with an unprecedented credit boom. Figure 4 illustrates the high correlation
between credit growth and economic activity. However, disentangling causes and consequences from
this strong association poses several challenges. In this section we take crucial steps to address these
challenges and explore the relationship between credit and the massive accumulation of productive
factors (capital and labor).
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Figure 4: Credit and output growth in Spain.
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Notes. Credit (right axis) refers to bank credit to non-financial corporations taken from Banco de Espan˜a and output
(left axis) refers to nominal GDP taken from the National Statistics Institute (INE). Source: Alfaro et al. (2018).
Since the seminal paper by Khwaja and Mian (2008), the literature disentangles credit supply
from credit demand by using data at the bank-firm (loan) level, and accounting for firm×time fixed
effects in the regressions. Intuitively, imagine one firm and two banks in year t− 1. If the credit of
the firm grows more between t − 1 and t with the first bank, one can assume that this is because
the credit supply of the first bank is larger than that of the second bank. This is so because demand
factors are kept constant given the inclusion of firm×time-specific effects.
Using this strategy together with Spanish Credit Registry data at the loan level, Alfaro et al.
(2018) estimate unobserved credit supply shocks by means of bank×time effects after accounting
for credit demand (firm×time effects).4 Armed with the bank-time credit supply shocks and having
4Note that Alfaro et al. (2018) estimate time-varying credit supply shocks instead of considering observed bank
matched the credit registry information to firm-level administrative data, Alfaro et al. (2018) find
that the estimated effects of credit supply on real variables are sizable: for instance, a one standard
deviation increase in credit supply generates an increase of 0.3, 0.1 and 0.8 pp. in employment
growth, output growth and investment, respectively.
Importantly, Alfaro et al. (2018) analyze not only the direct but also the indirect effects of
bank-lending shocks. Firms not directly hit by a credit supply shock may be affected through buyer-
supplier relations. For instance, if a supplier of firm j is hit by a negative credit supply shock, the
reaction of this supplier may also affect production of firm j. The indirect effects of credit supply
shocks can operate through various channels. If a negative credit supply shock hits firms operating
in a given industry, the production in this industry will decrease, which is likely, in equilibrium,
supply shocks as in Khwaja and Mian (2008), who consider exogenous variation in banks’ liquidity due to nuclear
tests in Pakistan.
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to make its output more expensive. Customer firms will then be forced to decrease production.
Downstream propagation proxies for this effect. In addition, when a negative credit supply shock
hits firms operating in a given industry, their revenue and, hence, their demand for intermediate
goods, is likely to go down. This will affect their supplier industries, which will be forced to scale
down production. Upstream propagation proxies for this indirect effect.
According to the results in Alfaro et al. (2018), indirect credit shocks through input-output prop-
agation have a significant effect on the evolution of firm-level employment, output and investment
over the 2003-2013 period. In particular, the magnitude of downstream propagation forces system-
atically dominates the direct effect of credit shocks.5 This finding corroborates the importance of
network propagation in quantifying the real effects of credit shocks.
In order to quantify the aggregate impact of credit shocks on real activity, Alfaro et al. (2018)
formulate a general equilibrium economy with buyer-supplier relations under the presence of financial
frictions as in Bigio and La’o (2017) and study how the identified credit shocks at the bank-firm level
are amplified though the economy using the Spanish Input-Output relations. In particular, Alfaro
et al. (2018) aggregate the estimated credit supply shocks from the firm level to the industry level,
in a way that makes them comparable over time in order to plug these shocks into the model and
examine how they permeate the economy. The results indicate that IO linkages significantly amplify
the effects of credit supply shocks. The model predicts, for instance, that around 0.74 pp. of the
actual 4.20% employment growth between 2004 and 2005, in the middle of the boom period, was due
to the identified credit supply shocks. Out of it, 1/2 was due to network/propagation effects and the
other 1/2 was due to direct effects.
Alfaro et al. (2018) also use the model to investigate the relative importance of each sector in
5Note also that while downstream propagation is larger during the financial crisis period (2008-2009), it is also
sizable during the expansion phase analyzed in this article.
Figure 5: IO structure (left panel) and output losses of isolated industry specific shocks (right panel)
Notes. The left panel shows the IO structure of the Spanish economy for the year 2010 (direct requirement matrix).
Element {i, j} represents the amount of euros spent by industry i in goods from industry j as a fraction of gross
output in industry i. A contour plot method is used, showing only those shares greater than 1%, 2%, 5%, 10% and
20%. The right panel shows the output loss due to the direct (x-axis) and propagation effect (y-axis) between 2008
and 2009 of applying our industry-specific shocks one by one. Source: Alfaro et al. (2018).
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accounting for the aggregate effects. In particular, we compute counterfactual economies in which
we only shock one industry at a time. Perhaps not surprisingly, the sector that generates the largest
output drop is the real estate sector. Our model predicts that shocking just the real state sector
would generate an aggregate output loss of 0.24%. While it was hit particularly strongly by the
credit supply shock at the time of the crisis, real estate is also intensively used by other sectors. In
fact, our model predicts that around 50% of the 0.24% loss is explained by propagation of the shock
to other sectors. We also find that shocking other central sectors like electricity services or wholesale
would also generate large output losses (see Figure 5).
The estimates in Alfaro et al. (2018) suggest that bank credit supply increased substantially
during the boom years in Spain. Regarding the origins of this credit supply increase, several hy-
potheses have been discussed in the literature despite the ultimate cause is not well understood yet.
Jime´nez et al. (2014) consider access to securitization as a source of variation in banks’ credit supply,
which substantially increased during the boom years. Basco and Lopez-Rodriguez (2017) analyze
the origins of the residential mortgage debt boom in Spain and hint to a possible feedback between
financial regulation, housing bubbles and mortgage debt. Finally, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2013)
emphasize the role of changes in zoning regulations, corruption and bad institutions.
According to the theoretical framework discussed in Martin et al. (2018), the Spanish housing
bubble increased the housing sector’s credit demand on impact, raising interest rates and crowding-
out credit to goods production. However, the bubble eventually generated loan repayments which
raised the profits and the net worth of Spanish banks, which enabled them to borrow more funds from
the rest of the world, increasing capital inflows and expanding the supply of credit for all domestic
sectors. The left panel of Figure 6 provides some suggestive evidence for this mechanism. During the
first years of the bubble, credit to non-construction firms grew less in low-exposed banks than in high-
exposed banks, supporting the static crowding-out effect. However, credit to non-construction firms
from high-exposed banks eventually grew more and surpassed that of low-exposed banks, confirming
the dynamic crowding-in effects of the bubble.
Figure 6: Credit to non-construction firms in different banks.
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Notes. In the left panel, high (low) exposed banks are above (below) the 90th (10th) percentile of the share of
mortgage-backed credit before 1995. Dashed lines are HP trends of the original series. The right panel shows the
yearly OLS estimates of the effect of bank bubble exposure on credit growth at the bank-firm level in a sample of
non-housing firms. Source: Martin et al. (2018).
The pattern in the left panel of Figure 6 is suggestive but not decisive evidence in favor of the
hypothesis in Martin et al. (2018). The concern is that client firms of high and low-exposed banks
may be systematically different. To alleviate this concern and concentrate on the credit supply side,
Martin et al. (2018) exploit the rich structure of the Spanish Credit Registry data by using an
empirical strategy inspired by Khwaja and Mian (2008). Precisely, we regress credit growth at the
firm-bank level on time-sector dummies, bank exposure to the housing bubble, and firm×time fixed
effects. The latter are crucial, as they control for any firm-level credit demand shocks. Thus, the
estimates capture the differential credit growth for the same firm with a more or less exposed bank.
Martin et al. (2018) proxy banks exposure to the bubble by the ratio of mortgage-backed credit to
total credit. Since bank exposure might be endogenous, we instrument it with pre-bubble exposure,
that is, the ratio of mortgage-backed credit to total credit before 1996.
Regression results confirm the crowding-out / crowding-in patterns induced by the bubble as
shown in the right panel of Figure 6. Around 2004, credit growth for the same non-construction firm
was lower at banks which were more exposed to the housing bubble. In the last years of the boom,
instead, this pattern was reversed and credit growth for the same non-construction firm became
higher in more exposed banks. Note also that during the crash, credit growth for all firms was
generally lower in more exposed banks.
According to this hypothesis, the real estate bubble fueled the unprecedented credit expansion
observed during the Spanish boom in non-construction sectors.6 Understanding the ultimate origins
of the Spanish housing bubble is beyond the scope of the present article. However, it is worth
highlighting that several factors contributed to its appearance: demand for housing exploded as
baby boomers became older and immigrants were coming to Spain, the soil liberalization laws in the
late 1990s boosted the construction of new houses, the fiscal treatment of ownership versus rental
provided incentives to buy rather than rent, and the marked decline in interest rates in Spain favored
a real estate appreciation in search of yield.
4 A microscopic view of aggregate productivity
This section discusses the determinants of Spanish productivity and its evolution during the 1995-
2007 period using a granular approach based on firm-level data. To be more concrete, the analysis
is based on administrative data taken from the Spanish Commercial Registry, which contains the
balance sheets of the universe of Spanish companies (Almunia et al. (2018) describe this database
6Needless to say, other factors such as loose monetary policies and the global saving glut also played a role.
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in greater detail). Section 4.1 shows that capital flows were not assigned efficiently to the best firms
within each sector, which explain the fall in aggregate productivity during the boom. Section 4.2
discusses the potential factors driving this deterioration in the allocation of resources.
4.1 Misallocation of resources across firms
A recent strand of the literature emphasizes the importance of the allocation of resources across firms
within narrowly-defined sectors in explaining aggregate differences in productivity performance across
countries. For instance, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) take the US economy as a benchmark an show
that lower TFP in China and India can be attributed to a worse allocation of resources across firms.
In their theoretical framework, an efficient / frictionless allocation of resources implies the maximum
possible TFP and equal marginal productivities (of both capital and labor) for all firms within a
given industry. Hence, any heterogeneity in marginal productivities across firms operating in the
same 4-digit industry is interpreted as a measure of misallocation.7
More recently, there are several papers that analyze the evolution over time of these misallocation
measures for a given country. Taking the initial year as a benchmark, they assess whether misallo-
cation improves or deteriorates over time. Bartelsman et al. (2013) find that allocative efficiency
remained roughly constant over the 1990s and early 2000s in several developed countries such as US,
UK, Germany or the Netherlands, while it clearly increased for the transitional economies of Central
and Eastern Europe. There is also evidence of increases in allocative efficiency across firms during
economic expansions in Chile and Switzerland (see Chen and Irarrazabal (2015) and Lewrick et al.
(2014), respectively). In contrast, Dias et al. (2015) document a sharp decline in allocative efficiency
in Portugal during the stagnant period between 1996 and 2011. Finally, Bellone and Mallen-Pisano
(2013) find that misallocation remained constant between 1998 and 2005 in France.
In the case of Spain, Garc´ıa-Santana et al. (2016) consider several misallocation measures with
all of them pointing to a sharp deterioration in the allocation of resources during the boom years
in all industries. Indeed, in the absence of this deterioration, aggregate TFP growth would have
been close to 1% per year, in line with the world technological frontier. Moreover, Garc´ıa-Santana
et al. (2016) also show that the role of misallocation across sectors (i.e. from non-construction to
construction) is much more limited than that of misallocation across firms within each sector. In
particular, we consider a counterfactual TFP measure, calculated by keeping the shares of the 5
largest sectors constant, equal to their values in 1995, alongside the evolution of the actual aggregate
TFP measures in Spain. While this counterfactual TFP measure falls slightly more slowly than
actual TFP, it still falls at an annual average rate of 0.4%, close to the actual 0.7% fall documented
in Section 2.
7There are other model-free measures of misallocation such as the Olley and Pakes (1996) covariance, which
capture the association between market shares and productivity: the stronger the association the better the allocation
of resources.
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Given that reallocation of resources across sectors accounts only for a small portion of the TFP
decline during 1995-2007, we are left with the hypothesis of a worsening in the allocation of resources
across firms within sectors. To investigate this, Garc´ıa-Santana et al. (2016) use firm-level admin-
istrative data on around 350,000 firms per year in manufacturing, construction, trade, and services
for the period 1995-2007. Slicing the data into 518 4-digit industries, we document two patterns.
First, the within-sector dispersion of productivities across firms increased sharply during the ex-
pansion. In a frictionless economy we should observe no dispersion in firm-level revenue productivities
(for both capital and labor) within each industry because higher productivity firms should expand,
attracting more capital and workers, which in turn would diminish their revenue productivity (either
because of decreasing returns to scale or because of downward-sloping demand curves). Hence, dis-
Figure 7: Within-industry dispersion of average products of capital and labor.
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persion of revenue productivities across firms is a symptom of a poor allocation of resources across
firms. This is the idea behind the methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) outlined above. Figure
7 illustrates how dispersion of revenue productivity increased substantially in the case of capital
while remained roughly constant in the case of labor. According to the analysis in Garc´ıa-Santana
et al. (2016), this finding implies that, had misallocation (i.e. dispersion in revenue productivities)
remained at its level in 1995, Spanish TFP would have grown by 0.8% per year. This result means
that technological progress did not come to a halt in Spain, but capital and labor were not assigned
efficiently to the best projects within each sector.
Second, firm growth during this period was inversely related to initial productivity. That is,
during the boom years, low productivity firms were assigned more capital and labor than high
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productivity firms. As a result, the former outgrew the latter. Figure 8 displays this surprising
pattern for a selection of six industries, but this result is widespread across most industries. Following
Foster et al. (2006), industry productivity growth can be decomposed into four parts: (i) firms
productivity growth weighted by size; (ii) firms size growth weighted by productivity; (iii) a cross-
term capturing the interaction between firms productivity growth and size growth; and (iv) two
extra terms capturing entry and exit. The pattern documented in Figure 8 illustrates the second
component of this decomposition, which turns out to explain the whole fall in productivity according
to the evidence presented in Garc´ıa-Santana et al. (2016).
Figure 8: Misallocation of resources across firms in Spain.
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Notes. Relative TFP refers to the logarithm of firm-specific TFP relative to the industry average. Change in share
refers to the difference in firm-specific market share measured in terms of value added. Source: Garc´ıa-Santana et
al. (2016).
4.2 Drivers of the deterioration in the allocation of resources
The deterioration of resource allocation across firms was pervasive across all industries, but there
was substantial variation among them. Garc´ıa-Santana et al. (2016) exploit this variation to shed
some light on the possible factors behind the increase in misallocation. According to their findings,
industries in which the incidence of regulations is greater present productivity losses twice as large
as those in the remaining sectors. To be more concrete, we define two groups of industries according
to the extent of public sector influence, either high or low. On aggregate, had the whole economy
behaved as the low-incidence sectors, the overall TFP would have increased an extra 0.3% per year
during 1995-2007. Understanding the mechanisms at the root of this pattern represents an exciting
line of open research.
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Alternatively, the role of firm financing might also explain the deterioration in allocative efficiency
of capital. For instance, Gopinath et al. (2017) find that within sector misallocation is larger
in industries with higher financial dependence. Focusing on manufacturing industries, Gopinath
et al. (2017) document a significant increase in productivity losses from capital misallocation in
Southern European countries, most notably Spain. They consider a model with size-dependent
financial frictions and heterogeneous firms in which declining interest rates cause an increase in the
dispersion in the productivity of capital. In their model, when the interest rate falls, all firms invest
more and expand aggregate capital and output. However, capital inflows are misallocated towards
firms that have higher net worth but are not necessarily more productive.
Basco et al. (2018) propose an alternative hypothesis based on the role of the housing bubble
through the so-called collateral channel. We show that misallocation of resources across firms in-
creased more in municipalities with higher housing prices growth. In order to illustrate the argument,
Figure 9 plots the evolution of misallocation (variance of the capital-labor ratio) for three groups of
municipalities. Overall, misallocation increased by 26.9% between 2000 and 2007, which is in line
with the findings in Garc´ıa-Santana et al. (2016) and Gopinath et al. (2017). However, this aggre-
gate figure conceals the differential increase across municipalities. Indeed, the blue (red) line reports
the evolution of misallocation in housing supply elastic (inelastic) municipalities illustrating that
the two lines grow apart during the housing bubble and start converge after the bubble burst. The
increase in misallocation was around 20% in housing supply elastic municipalities and it was twice as
large (around 40% ) in housing supply inelastic municipalities. Therefore, this figure suggests that
the housing bubble exacerbated the misallocation of capital in Spain. This suggestive evidence is
corroborated by regression analysis at the industry-municipality level in Basco et al. (2018).
Figure 9: Misallocation and the Spanish housing bubble.
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Basco et al. (2018) also provide regression-based evidence at the firm-level in favor of this
hypothesis. In particular, we consider housing supply elasticity as an instrument for house price
growth at the municipality level in order to enhance identification of causal effects. According to
the estimates in Basco et al. (2018), housing prices growth favored investment of firms with larger
shares of real estate assets within the same industry. Also, firms located in municipalities with
larger housing prices growth presented larger investment rates for a given share of real estate assets.
Through the lens of the model of bubbles discussed in Basco et al. (2018), these two patterns can be
interpreted as industry and geography misallocation, respectively. Using credit registry data, Basco
et al. (2018) also show that misallocation of credit can account for this misallocation of capital, both
in terms of the intensive margin (credit growth) and the extensive margin (loan granting). All in
all, bank lending policies biased towards firms with higher collateral (higher value of housing-related
assets) but not necessarily higher marginal productivity of capital would explain these patterns.
Jime´nez et al. (2018) also investigate the potential role of bank lending policies in shaping
aggregate TFP in the case of the Spanish economy. To be more concrete, we find that the probability
that a loan application is granted increases with firm productivity, even after fully accounting for
the supply side by means of bank-time fixed effects. This finding suggests that Spanish banks
discriminate not only in terms of ex-ante credit risk but also in terms of firms productivity. This
finding implies that bank lending policies might play a role in the allocation of resources/capital
towards more or less productive firms.
On the other hand, Jime´nez et al. (2018) also find that banks soften their lending standards
during expansions. The economic cycle and the monetary policy stance affect lending standards in
terms of firms’ productivity, which means that when the economy is growing or in a loosen monetary
policy environment, banks react taking on more risk. In other words, their screening process reduces
the relative importance of productivity (or ex-ante credit risk), to the point of not taking them
into account. Indeed, Figure 10 illustrates this pattern given that the association between firms’
productivity and the probability of loan granting is not statistically different from zero during the
boom years in Spain.8
In addition to the evolution over time discussed above, the Spanish economy is also characterized
by the presence of a large number of small firms in comparison to other developed economies. For
instance, firms with less than 9 employees account for 41% of total employment in Spain while this
figure is 20% in Germany and 32% in France. Along these lines, Moral-Benito (2018) documents that
Spanish firms are less productive than their European counterparts at all size categories even after
controlling for the sector composition of the economy (see Figure 11). For instance, productivity
of Spanish firms with 1-9 employees is 19% lower than the corresponding EU4 average according
to EUROSTAT and 36% lower according to the OECD. In the case of large firms with more than
8Finally, it is also worth highlighting that these patterns are more marked in the case of less capitalized, less liquid
and more profitable (higher risk profile) banks.
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250 employees, Spanish firms’ productivity is 12% and 17% lower according to EUROSTAT and the
OECD.
Figure 10: Correlation between firm-specific TFP and loan granting.
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Notes. This figure plots the year-by-year coefficient of a regression of a loan granting dummy on TFP and a set of
controls (size, age, default rate, total assets, industry, and financial expenditures) in a cross-section of Spanish firms.
Source: Jime´nez et al. (2018).
Using matching methods on a sample of Spanish firms, Moral-Benito (2018) shows that produc-
tivity shocks are followed by significant increases in firm size (see right panel of Figure 11) while size
shocks are not followed by productivity gains at the firm level. According to these findings, the low
productivity of Spanish firms with respect to their European counterparts might be at the root of the
Spanish size distribution excessively biased towards small firms rather than the other way around.
As a consequence, the low productivity at the firm level could also explain the dismal evolution of
aggregate productivity in Spain.9
This finding raises an obvious question: Why do Spanish firms have worse abilities to convert
inputs into output? In addition to inefficient product market regulations and low levels of competition
that are typically to blame, we highlight here the potential role of managerial talent, quality of inputs,
and R&D activities based on the survey by Syverson (2011). Available cross-country evidence reveals
that Spanish firms perform substantially worse than their EU4 counterparts in all the three factors,
which may explain, at least partially, their dismal performance in terms of productivity (see Moral-
Benito, 2018).
9On the other hand, size-dependent policies, by preventing most productive firms to grow, can also explain a
fraction of the aggregate productivity differences across countries (Guner et al. (2008)). Note however that Garicano,
et al. (2016) and Garc´ıa-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) have found modest effects when evaluating real size-dependent
policies in France and India.
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Figure 11: Spain-to-EU4 productivity ratio by firm size and the TFP-size nexus.
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5 Concluding Remarks
A 3.1 % expansion for the year 2017 as a whole marked Spain’s third successive year of above 3 per
cent growth. This performance was, moreover, against the background of the continuing external
surplus, the de-leveraging process of Spanish firms and households, and the positive growth of total
factor productivity. These three phenomena suggest that the nature of the current recovery is more
sustainable than that of the previous expansion. Still, understanding the drivers of the 1995-2007
boom may be helpful in order to avoid the pitfalls of the past.
GDP growth during the 1995-2007 expansion was truly remarkable in terms of magnitude and
duration, but it was completely based on factor accumulation rather than productivity gains. The
1995-2007 expansion was also accompanied by a housing bubble that fueled an unprecedented in-
crease in credit, which expanded even faster than GDP. This article summarizes a line of research
investigating how these aggregate fluctuations could have been originated through the lens of the
micro data on Spanish firms and banks.
Three main findings stand out. First, the abundant credit supply partially induced by the housing
bubble significantly contributed to the massive accumulation of labor and capital. Second, the role of
resource misallocation across firms appears to be the key driver of the dismal evolution of aggregate
productivity. In particular, too much resources, especially capital flows, were assigned to the worst
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firms within each industry with the subsequent costs in terms of aggregate productivity. Third,
misallocation of credit during the boom period may partially explain the misallocation of capital.
Too much credit was fueled to firms with high real-estate collateral, especially in municipalities with
higher housing prices growth, regardless of their productivity. Indeed, there is also evidence that
banks softened their credit standards in terms of firms’ productivity.
Finally, two caveats are worth highlighting: on the one hand, other factors not discussed in this
article played a role in shaping the characteristics of the Spanish boom (e.g. migration inflows);
on the other hand, the ultimate causes that triggered all these events in the first place are not well
understood yet (e.g. capital inflows and low interest rates, soil liberalization laws). A detailed review
of these issues is beyond the scope of the present article.
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